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GIFTS AND TRADE
Mirowskian, Gudemanian, and Milbergian
themes
John Davis

The grand narrative has lost its credibility, regardless of
what mode of unification it uses, regardless of whether it is
a speculative narrative or a narrative of emancipation.
(Lyotard, 1984: 37)
Saying that there is no master discourse allows us to see the space of
discourse as constituted out of competing discourses, each of which may
itself claim to be a master discourse. A postmodern interrogation of rivalrous discourses may proceed by granting each a temporary, relative
integrity, so as to represent the whole space they occupy as an interaction
between claimant master discourses, the interaction between them tending
to reinforce or erode the identity of each. The relative integrity of each individual discourse may then be investigated in terms of its current
conceptual structure, a network of compulsory meanings and allowable
inferences between meanings. Discourses' identities are transient, because
these structures do not endure. Their reconstruction or collapse is driven by
their interaction with rival discourses and by internally discovered structural incoherences, either of which may undermine stability of meaning,
cause its dissemination, and necessitate the rebuilding of new meaning
structures, shifting or creating discourses' identities.
Philip Mirowski tracks the rise and fall of the postwar economic
anthropological discourse on the gift that treated the meaning of giving
the gift as polar alternative to the meaning of reciprocal exchange. For
Marshall Sahlins and Chris Gregory, the meanings of both gift and
exchange are embedded in a social-cultural concept nest: [kinship
ties / clan distinctions / social political hierarchies], which determines
allowable inferences regarding where material transfers fall on a single
continuum from gift to balanced reciprocity to even negative reciprocity
(or agression). In effect, the discourse's structure makes the socialcultural concept nest arbitrate inferences regarding how we classify
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material transfers. The inferential vehicle by which this arbitration occurs
is the discourse's premising inclusion-exclusion membership patterns in
social-cultural groups as the central invariant in the system. Gifts are
then classified as what is transferred between or within 'like' sOcial
groups. Where 'like' social groups do not come into play, material
transfer operates according to principles of reciprocal exchange, that is
according to the abstract logic of pure value equivalence.
'
For Sahlins and Gregory, however, this alternative principle of invariance must be thought subordinate to the social likeness group principle
of invariance. When we make social group likeness our focus, abstract
value equivalence appears as a socially disembedded form of material
transfer. Thus the social-cultural concept nest arbitrates inferences
regarding how we interpret gifts and exchanges, and in particular
defines reciprocal exchange as 'non-gift' transfer.
Yet Mirowski argues, on closer scrutiny the discourse's proposed
social group likeness principle of invariaru;:e lacks stable meaning.
Sahlins and Gregory's texts are unable to develop and sustain the
concept of inclusion-€xclusion membership in a social group, and even
add to its conceptual instability by retreating to market concepts of
scarcity and exchange to 'help' explain what increasingly becomes the
'gift economy.' Even worse, they allow that gifts alter social-cultural
groupings, thereby undermining the very idea of social group likeness as
a distinct principle of system invariance.
Left standing, the victor by default, is abstract value equivalence as
the system's only principle of invariance explaining material transfers.
The gift in its original sense as non-reciprocated transfer is now simply
the 'other', the non-commodity. But emptied of independent content it
cannot be understood but as part of 'gift exchange' (except perhaps as
briefly disguised by giftwrap - price tags discreetly removed of course).
The implication of Mirowski's argument is that postwar economic
anthropological discourse on the gift was corrupt from the outset. But
this is not a Derridean corruption, an irresistable displacement of
meaning that frustrates any settled interpretation of the meaning of the
gift whatsoever. Rather the source of the corruption lies in the
discourse's determination to set the meaning of the gift as 'non-exchange
material transfer alternative to reciprocal exchange', a conceptual apparatus rather at the heart of market economy discourse.
Having begun in this way, economic anthropological discourse found
itself saddled with an alien conceptual structure. In particular, 'material
transfers' presupposed 'principles of invariance', which would then need
to be drawn from the social-cultural concept nest that constituted the
pre-existing conceptual apparatus of economic anthropological discourse.
But this concept nest (it should perhaps have been recognized) does not
readily accomodate invariance principles. Inevitably then, it must also
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fail as an arbiter of material transfer classifications, thereby ultimatel
causing collapse of the discourse's conceptual structure.
y
It was consequently the interaction of the two discourses that under~ed . the ~emp~rary r~lative integrity ~f economic anthropology,
pOlsorungl dissemmatmg Its concept of the gIft, and eroding its transient
identity as a discourse distinct from market economy discourse. But how
on this view of relatively distinct discourses in competition does
Mirowski understand neoclassical economic theory?
Following Alvin Gouldner, he argues that a system of pure value
equivalence, with pervasive balance in exchange, zero arbitrage, and 'no
trade' theorems everywhere, is an unstable conceptual system because it
provides no reason for trade - its own paradox of intentionality. The 'no
free lunch' crowd accordingly cannot resist the concept of the gift
without return, because it is precisely the concept of gain from trade
needed in but absent from the bloodless conceptual apparatus of
exchange of equivalent for equivalent. We might, then, imagine that
contact with anthropological discourse has contaminated neoclassical
discourse in a manner not dissimilar to the manner in which neoclassicism has corrupted economic anthropology.
But this does not seem to be Mirowski's argument. Rather his
Goedelian argument, in two steps, is that (a) any formally definite
system must contain results stateable but not provable within the system,
and (b) post hoc, sleight-of-hand inclusions of undecidable statements
into formal systems is a mug's game, an irreducibly arbitrary procedure
that creates a false sense of comprehenSive explanation. Thus it is neoclassicism 's conceptual pretension to structural completeness, an internal
incoherence, that ultimately betrays it, not the vitality of an alternative
discourse. Indeed, neoclassicism's appropriation of anthropology'S gift
concept of unrequited gain is opportunistic and gratuitous, since the
discourse's structural strategy of closure by addition of undecidable
statement creates an open field of concepts from which to select, a point
made especially evident by the jack-of-all trades development of game
theory.
Pol. [Behind] What, hoI help, help, help!
Ham. [Drawing] How now! a rat? Dead, for a ducat, dead!
[Makes a pass through the arras.]
Pol. [Behind] 0, I am slain!
[Falls and dies.]
Modernism rests securely upon a paradox. (1) It (modernism) begins
by supposing that reality anchors language, and gives language its intelligibility. Truth is ordinarily and widely thought of as a correspondence
between statements, propositions, or sentences and states of affairs in the
world. Individual terms and expressions are typically thought to acquire
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their meanings according to what they stand for, refer to, or pick out from
the world. Thus reality both lies behind language and regulates language.
(2) Yet because reality can only be described in language, we are never able
to consult reality apart from language to determine whether language does
indeed describe reality. We attempt to tum from language to the real, but
only discover language once again. Thus it seems that language cannot be
about reality. (3) But what is language about if it is not about reality? To say
language is about language seems to say little, if anything at all. (4) [Return
to (1)].
Gudeman sees economic anthropologists and neoclassical economists as
both offering essentialist and modernist approaches to understanding gifts
and reciprocity, the former basing their analysis on altruism, and the latter
basing theirs on sell-interest. The generation of anthropologists since
Marcel Mauss has regarded reciprocity as a pillar of social life, because they
believe reciprocity accurately reflects the character of dyadic relationships
between individuals that anthropologists believe to be.at the core of society.
Neoclassical economists also regard reciprocity as a pillar of social life, but
alternatively believe reciprocity reflects the play of individual motivation in
dyadic relationships that neoclassical economists regard as being at the core
of society. Both then, believe their respective discourses rest on real
economic and social foundations. These foundations regulate what they
may each say about reciprocity, exchange, and gifts by determining the
truth of the statements they make and the meanings of their individual
terms and expressions. These real world foundations also validate their
respective characterizations of reciprocity, exchange, and gifts, since each
view is judged, preferred to the other in virtue of its more accurately
capturing underlying real world foundations. Of course it makes little sense
to suppose that two discourses that contradict one another are both correct
and accurate reflections of one and the same real world. Yet neither anthropologists nor economists can consult the world apart from the discourse in
which they operate to compare language and reality, and then demonstrate
their view to be correct and their opponent's mistaken. Both of course claim
to get at the essentials of reciprocity, but neither is acquainted with
anything more than a concept of the essential.
Indeed since every attempt to acquire access to the real world must
produce but another concept of the real world, for essentialists the real
must always appear in endless retreat from possible capture in language.
But let us bring this tedious story to a close. Since any attempt to penetrate
the veil of language and grasp the real world must destroy the object
sought, we should abandon the notion that discourses rest on real world
foundations, and ask how else we might understand gifts and reciprocity.
Gudeman's view is that economic processes may be seen to be organized
in two distinct ways that appear separately, in shifting combinations, and in
tension with one another. There are production and distribution processes
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that economists study as the market economy, but these processes are
also socially mediated through families, household groups, villages,
nations, etc. that anthropologists study as the community form of the
economy. Reciprocity consequently needs to be understood differently
according to the operant perspective. But it is a mistake to think that this
means reciprocity simply corresponds to different things for economists
and anthropologists.
For Gudeman reciprocity does not correspond to any set of institutions or processes in the community form of the economy, but is rather a
way of making community. First, the gift extends the commons to
someone outside a community. The gift transforms social relationships.
Second, if the gift is reciprocated, the return both accepts commensality,
yet also signals difference and independence. The reciprocal exchange of
gifts consequently creates a larger, encompassing community in which
there always remains a fragile balance between distance and closeness,
detachment and warmth. Thus, if the gift in anthropological discourse is
'about' anything, it is about the uncertainty of community. But then we
should not attempt to understand the language of gifts and reciprocity as
a reflection of something behind discourse. Reciprocity is not at the core
of society. Reciprocity is an expression of social economic processes - a
secondary phenomenon, a badge worn, if briefly, upon the giving of the
gift.
Link to Local Home Page
This goes on every page. Given the nature of the Web, you
can't assume that everyone is beginning at the same starting
point and following the links down. The user could be bailing in
from some other link to somewhere deep in the dusty comers of
the sprawl. The user may be completely lost, or may assume that
your page is part of the company he or she just branched from.
This can also happen with users using bookmarks to specific
pages. Always show them a way home.
(Cearley, 1998: 187)
Modernist metanarratives require centers of gravitation. They anchor
a conceptual apparatus by identifying points of entry that channel
passage to other conceptual sites. Those latter sites thus come with
genealogies. A concept-site first gains meaning in terms of its association
with the concept-sites previously visited; it gains additional meaning in
terms of associations with concepts-sites subsequently visited. The entire
narrative is understood in terms of its point of entry. At" the same time,
concepts-sites that cannot be accessed from a network of conceptual sites
are impaired in their meaning from the perspective of the network. They
either fall entirely outside the network, or should they be accessible, they
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inherit the genealogy of the network with its original center of gravitation. That is ... unless the network's travellers pass far enough out upon
the network's periphery that the gravitational pull of its center ceases to
operate. Then one might even pass to another network whose links are
designed to direct the traveler to this new network's center of gravity.
Preventing escape from a conceptual network, casual or intentional, thus
requires that it be centripetally constructed. 'Always show them a way
home.'
William Milberg knows the way home in 'neoclassical international
economics'. At the top of the neoclassical home page it reads, 'the
economy as market'. From there one goes to 'competition' where one
learns about 'equilibrium'. Having visited these sites one is then sufficiently prepared to click on 'general equilibrium competitive analysis',
from which one can finally access 'the theory of international trade',
including such otherwise accessible sites as 'Heckscher-Ohlin', 'StolperSamuelson', and 'Rybczinski' (all accompanied b.¥ easy links to the
necessary bio sites). A convenient feature of the network as a whole is
that it is designed to return the visitor from any particular concept-site to
other concept-sites of importance. Or, one always has the option of
simply returning to 'home', and then passing down through any of the
pathways in the network one chooses. An egalitarian feature of the
network is that accidental visitors to any of the network's concept-sites
are treated no differently than regular visitors. The highly developed
character of the network is reflected in the fact that these accidental visi- .
tors are encouraged at every possible point to go to 'home' so as to be
able to learn the network from its point of entry.
Of course discourses are always under (re)construction. Their producers
are ever in search of ways to better organize their concept-sites, and this
process continually reveals new implications and connections not previously imagined that then require integration into the overall network.
However there are risks involved. Because reconstruction is initially
focused on a particular concept-site in the network, the consequences of its
reconstruction are often not immediately apparent.
Milberg asks us to consider the case of site foreman, Paul Krugman,
founder of the 'new international economics'. For a long time the 'theory
of international trade' site was closely connected to the 'competition' site.
Krugman wondered whether it might not be possible to link the former
site to an infrequently visited one, 'imperfect competition'. From there he
imagined further connections to 'game-playing man' (replacing visits to
'rational economic man') and 'trade-oriented industrial/commercial
policies' (replacing visits to 'laissez jaire/ free trade'). Krugman's argument for re-connecting the 'theory of international trade' in these ways
was based on the importance of intra-industry trade and the apparent
success of trade-orientated policies in Japan and South Korea.
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Yet as Milberg explains, Krugman soon found that these strategies for
developing the 'neoclassical international economics' site met with
considerable disfavor from others involved in the maintenance and
reconstruction of both this site and the 'economy as market' site in which
it is embedded. The issue was later cast as a technical problem involved
in re-building the 'theory of international trade' site: 'the models were
too sensitive to particular assumptions, and they encouraged unrealistic
attempts to fine tune the activities of the state'. But Milberg identifies a
more serious problem with Krugman's strategies. His proposed connections seemed to involve stronger links to other home pages than to the
'economy as market' home page. Indeed, upon arriving at the 'imperfect
competition' site one does find connections to 'transnational corporations' and 'the state', which in turn have close links to the 'political
economy' home page.
Krugman, it seems, originally failed to appreciate how far out on the
periphery of the 'economy as market' network the 'transnational corporations' and 'the state' sites lay. But to his credit he soon recognized that
visiting those sites was incompatible with the centripetal nature of the
'economy as market' network. At least in the short run, then, until a
fuller structure of links through the 'optimization' site could be created
for 'transnational corporations' and 'the state', he agreed that work
would have to be discontinued in this area.
But lest the implications of all this be misunderstood, note that
Milberg does not recommend a politics of constructing a rival 'political
economy' home page with peripheral links designed to invade the
'economy as market' home page and lure its visitors away. In fact, he
tells us that a postrnodern theory of international trade must lack a
central metaphor and cannot be rendered into a single metanarrative.
There seems to be both positive and normative reasons for thinking
this. From a positive point of view, it is naive to suppose that the center
can hold in any discourse for any extended period of time. Discourse is
always decentering itself, because the opportunity to explore in ways
that may take one outwards from any given site will always constitute an
attraction. From a normative point of view, on the other hand, it seems
we ought also resist the modernist impulse to compel conceptual traffic
to follow rigidly predetermined pathways. Indeed, we ought to
encourage travellers to visit the 'free trade in ideas' site (one, it turns out,
without links to the neoclassical 'economy as market' site). They should
travel prepared, however. The 'free trade in ideas' site is always under
construction.
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